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STATEMENT OF INTEREST 
The National Association for Public Defense 
(“NAPD”) is an association of more than 14,000 attor-
neys, investigators, social workers, administrators and 
others professionals who fulfill constitutional mandates 
to deliver public defense representation throughout all 
U.S. states and territories. NAPD members advocate for 
clients in jails, courtrooms, and communities, and are 
experts in the theory and practice of evidence-based 
quality service to people who are charged with crimes 
but who cannot afford to hire counsel. They serve in 
state, county, and local systems through full-time, con-
tract, and assigned counsel who litigate juvenile, cap-
ital and appellate cases through a diversity of tradi-
tional and holistic practice models.   
Moreover, NAPD’s membership includes all staff 
providing legal representation through the Common-
wealth’s Committee for Public Counsel Services (CPCS) as 
well as over 100 assigned counsel in Massachusetts. CPCS 
leaders are active in NAPD leadership through committee 
work and as faculty for the annual NAPD Leadership In-
stitute. CPCS also has shared thousands of pages of cru-
cial defender trial resources with public defenders 
across that nation through MyGideon, NAPD’s secure pub-
lic defense library.  
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This partnership gives NAPD a strong interest in 
maintaining access to the courts and fair, reliable case 
outcomes through the provision of quality public defense 
service for the people of Massachusetts. In addition, 
NAPD’s insight into the real-world effects of criminal 
convictions on individuals and their families anchors 
our strong interest in preventing the systemic overload 
and breakdown of public defense in the Commonwealth. 
Based on the foregoing factors, we hope the Court will 
find our perspective helpful. 
  STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS 
NAPD hereby accepts and adopts the Statements of 
the Case and Facts as set forth in the Corrected Joint 
Brief of Petitioners and the Intervener.   
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As the highest courts in Florida, Missouri, Michi-
gan, New York, and Pennsylvania have demonstrated, sys-
temic relief is necessary and appropriate to cure sys-
temic failures that deny access to courts by imposing 
overwhelming demands on struggling public defense sys-
tems. Government misconduct created exactly that type of 
constitutional crisis by flooding the Commonwealth’s 
criminal legal system with 24,000 Dookhan cases. New 
revelations of even more corruption in the Common-
wealth’s forensic sciences system are now anticipated to 
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exacerbate that crisis by adding another 18,000 Farak 
wrongful-conviction cases. At the same time, the Dis-
trict Attorneys have undermined progress on fair, reli-
able case-by-case resolution of the Dookhan convictions 
by issuing misleading and ineffective communications re-
garding who is eligible to cure the government’s mis-
conduct, how they should obtain relief, and when they 
must do so. 
These developments underscore the unworkability of 
the current case-by-case approach to remedying the gov-
ernment misconduct at issue here. They demonstrate the 
compelling and immediate need for this Court to grant 
Petitioners’ requested relief by ordering these convic-
tions vacated with prejudice, or with a severely limited 
opportunity for district attorneys to justify refiling 
charges in specific cases that are supported by un-
tainted evidence and for the defense of which the Com-
monwealth’s public defense attorneys have sufficient re-
sources to provide timely, quality representation. Any 
other resolution only exacerbates the ongoing harm to 
thousands of people from egregious government miscon-
duct.  
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ARGUMENT 
I. SYSTEMIC RELIEF IS REQUIRED TO CURE A SYSTEMIC 
TAINT TO CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS THAT HAS OVERLOADED 
THE COMMONWEALTH’S PUBLIC DEFENSE SYSTEM. 
A. Systemic Taint is Causing Systemic Harm 
State courts across the country have approved sys-
temic relief as the necessary and appropriate response 
to constitutional crises created by systemic overload of 
public defense systems, such as the crisis created by 
government misconduct in the Dookhan cases. The Florida 
Supreme Court succinctly captured why such systemic 
failings require a systemic remedy, when swamped public 
defenders urged that case-by-case resolution of the cri-
sis was unworkable: 
In extreme circumstances where a problem is 
system-wide, the courts should not address the 
problem on a piecemeal case-by-case basis.  
This approach wastes judicial resources on re-
dundant inquiries.   
Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. v. 
State, 115 So. 3d 261, 274 (Fla. 2013). The Court further 
reasoned that “systemic aggregate relief” prevented 
courts from being “clogged with hundreds of individual 
motions” that would be “tantamount to applying a band 
aid to an open head wound.”  Id. 
As demonstrated below, systemic relief is equally 
necessary with respect to the convictions tainted by 
what this Court has determined to be egregious miscon-
duct attributable to the Commonwealth. This Court pre-
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viously ruled that, where Commonwealth prosecutors re-
lied on the tainted evidence at issue here, each defend-
ant “is entitled to a conclusive presumption that … mis-
conduct occurred[,] that it was egregious, and that it 
is attributable to the Commonwealth.”  Commonwealth v. 
Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 338 (2014). Yet despite the “con-
clusive presumption” of “egregious” wrongdoing, the cur-
rent case-by-case approach to curing that wrong has left 
the vast majority of the Dookhan convictions in full 
effect today. Indeed, only about six percent (6%) of 
defendants entitled to that presumption have even had 
motions to vacate filed on their behalf under the current 
case-by-case approach, much less had them resolved.  See 
R.App. 1938-40, ¶¶ 3, 8-9.  
These facts show that the case-by-case, “conclusive 
presumption” approach is not just unworkable, but that 
this approach has created exactly the type of backlog 
decried by the Florida Supreme Court.  Moreover, the 
Massachusetts backlog is causing even more immediate, 
serious, and tangible harm to these individuals and 
their families.  These tainted convictions are inflict-
ing myriad state and federal collateral consequences 
that block access to jobs, housing, support for educa-
tion, and other resources that promote productive par-
ticipation in society. See R.App. 1710-14, ¶¶ 4-8; Amer-
ican Bar Association, National Inventory of Collateral 
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Consequences of Conviction (Federal), http://www.aba-
collateralconsequences.org/search/ ?jurisdiction=1000; 
id. (Massachusetts) http://www. abacollateralconse-
quences.org/search/?jurisdiction=25; see also Margaret 
Colgate Love, Jenny Roberts, & Cecilia Klingele, Col-
lateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Law, Pol-
icy, and Practice (2016). 
Imposition of these immediate, tangible harms is 
all the more unjust because the majority of the tainted 
convictions involve lower-level drug possession charges 
that prosecutors chose to pursue in District Court. R. 
App. 1818 (62% of cases are possession-only); id. at 
1940 (90% of cases were prosecuted in District Court). 
Jurisdictions across the country are decriminalizing, 
dismissing, and diverting these types of low-level drug 
charges in order to refocus scarce resources on more 
serious crimes. See Human Rights Watch & American Civil 
Liberties Union, Every 25 Seconds: The Human Toll of 
Criminalizing Drug Use in the United States 184 (2016); 
National Research Council, The Growth of Incarceration 
in the United States:  
Exploring Causes and Consequences 352-353(2014); Alex-
andra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 Van-
derbilt L. Rev. 155 (2015). Indeed, reducing the flood 
of low-level cases in criminal legal systems is one way 
to reduce the risk of tainted pleas and wrongful con-
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victions such as those at issue here. See Robert Bo-
ruchowitz, et al., Minor Crimes, Massive Waste: The Ter-
rible Toll of America’s Broken Misdemeanor Courts 20-27 
(2009). 
B. Systemic Harm Requires Systemic Relief 
In light of these facts, it is unsurprising that 
other courts have joined Florida’s in ordering systemic 
relief to address systemic overload of public defense 
providers, and in doing so through the exercise of their 
inherent judicial authority and responsibility to su-
pervise the fair administration of justice. Signifi-
cantly, courts in these cases are acknowledging that 
systemic overload of the public defense function re-
quires critical analysis of system priorities in order 
to focus resources on the most serious cases.  
Indeed, Florida courts have invoked systemic relief 
not just once but repeatedly. In the case discussed 
above, Public Defender v. Florida, the state Supreme 
Court confronted a statute that forbade trial judges 
from granting motions to withdraw by public defenders 
who claimed that excessive caseloads created conflicts 
of interest.  The Court invoked its inherent supervisory 
authority to hold the statute unconstitutional as ap-
plied and to order class-based relief. 115 So. 3d 261, 
276–277.  More specifically, the Court affirmed a trial 
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court order allowing defenders categorically to refuse 
appointments in low-level felony cases. Id. at 271-272.  
In so ruling, the Florida Court expressly held that 
case-by-case, ex post facto analysis was “inappropriate” 
for addressing system-wide failure in the provision of 
public defense.  Id. at 276–277. Observing “how the ex-
cessive caseload ha[d] impacted the Public Defender’s 
representation of indigent defendants,” based on the 
“systematic inability” to perform basic attorney func-
tions, the Court authorized “aggregate/systematic mo-
tions to withdraw . . . in circumstances where there is 
an office-wide or wide-spread problem as to effective 
representation.”  Id. at 273-74 & n.8.   
The Court further stressed that “[i]n extreme cir-
cumstances where a problem is system-wide, the courts 
should not address the problem on a piecemeal case-by-
case basis.”  Id.  The Court also identified past in-
stances where it had invoked its inherent authority to 
“approve[] aggregate or systemic relief . . . where pub-
lic defenders were experiencing excessive caseloads or 
where the offices were underfunded.”  Id. at 272-73. 
Significantly, the Florida Supreme Court also 
acknowledged that unmanageable caseloads trigger ethical 
rules governing conflicts of interest.  The Court con-
cluded that systemic relief was necessary to address the 
“substantial risk that the representation of [one] or 
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more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s 
responsibilities to another client.”  Id. at 279; see 
also American Bar Association Standing Committee on Eth-
ics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Ethics Opin-
ion 06-441 (requiring public defenders to decline new 
cases if excessive workloads prevent make “competent and 
diligent representation” impossible).  
Missouri’s highest Court applied comparable rea-
soning in ordering systemic relief to address systemic 
overloads of that state’s public defense systems.  Mis-
souri Public Defender Commission v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 
592, 599–601, 612 (Mo. 2012). The Court ordered systemic 
relief by enforcing a state administrative rule allowing 
defender agencies to decline appointment in specific 
classes of cases. The Missouri Court, like the Florida 
Court, expressly cited ethical rules proscribing con-
flicts of interest, which “inevitably” result from ex-
cessive caseloads. Id. at 607. Also like the Florida 
Court, the Missouri Court invoked judges’ inherent “au-
thority and . . . responsibility to manage their dockets 
in a way that . . . respects” constitutional and ethical 
requirements. Id. at 610-611. It is equally clear that 
a case-by-case cure for the ongoing constitutional harms 
in these tainted cases is wholly unworkable and must be 
replaced with Petitioners’ requested system-wide solu-
tion. 
  - 10 - 
 
Yet another case in which state courts applied a 
systemic solution to systemic public defense overload is 
Hurrell-Harring v. State of New York, 81 A.D.3d 69, 914 
N.Y.S.2d 367  (App. Div. 2011). In Hurrell-Harring, as 
in the instant case, people who needed public defense 
lawyers suffered the effective denial of counsel because 
the system was too overloaded for existing counsel to 
handle their cases. The New York courts reasoned that 
such systemic breakdowns required a systemic response to 
address the risks posed to “potentially tens of thou-
sands of individuals” by inadequate public defense re-
sources instead of forcing plaintiffs to pursue case-
by-case relief. 81 A.D.3d at 71-73.  See also Nicholson 
v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 240 (E.D. N.Y. 2002) 
(“systemic barriers to effective representation” require 
systemic remedies “without individualized proof of in-
jury”; Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 
1353 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (“systemic problems” with case 
overloads make case-by-case remedies “totally inade-
quate”). 
Similarly, in Duncan v. Michigan, the Court ap-
proved a systemic approach instead of forcing plaintiffs 
to pursue case-by-case relief from “widespread and sys-
temic instances of actual or constructive denial of 
counsel” caused by case overloads and inadequate re-
sources. 774 N.W.2d 89, 124 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) Most 
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recently, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania also ap-
proved a systemic remedy to address systemic inadequa-
cies in public defense resources. Kuren v. Luzerne 
County, 2016 Pa. LEXIS 2191 (September 28, 2016). There, 
too, the state’s highest Court was called upon to address 
the systemic denial of access to counsel due to case 
overloads and insufficient staffing.  Id. at **16-24. 
Like other courts considering the issue, Pennsylvania’s 
highest court recognized that systemic problems require 
a systemic response instead of individualized, case-by-
case litigation, and allowed plaintiffs to proceed in 
their quest for prospective equitable relief.  Id. at 
*97. 
These cases demonstrate that comprehensive, system-
wide remedies are necessary and appropriate to correct 
the system-wide wrong caused by misconduct of prosecu-
tion witnesses in Massachusetts. This Court should fol-
low the lead of these sister courts, lest the current 
and demonstrably inadequate case-by-case approach de-
volve as did Louisiana’s following that state’s Supreme 
Court ruling in State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 
1993). 
Peart also involved systemic overload of public de-
fense systems. In a grim parallel to Petitioners’ cases, 
the Louisiana Supreme Court agreed that these systems 
were so swamped that people who needed public defense 
lawyers “were entitled to a rebuttable presumption” that 
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their constitutional rights were being violated.  Id. at 
790, 791.  Despite that indictment of the system, the 
Court declined to order systemic relief and instead re-
quired case-by-case adjudication with the burden on in-
digent defendants to vindicate their rights.  Id. at 
791.   
In the two decades since that ruling, the harm from 
the Court’s failure to order systemic relief from sys-
temic flaws in the provision of public defense has only 
compounded.  Louisiana currently faces an internation-
ally reported collapse of its public defense system.  
See, e.g., Justice Denied: The Human Toll of America’s 
Public Defender Crisis, The Guardian, September 7, 2016, 
available at: https://www. theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/sep/07/public-defender-us-criminal -justice-
system (last visited October 24, 2016).     
The contrast could not be clearer between individ-
ualized, case-by-case attempts to cure systemic flaws 
and the approaches of courts in Florida, Missouri, New 
York, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. The case-by-case ap-
proach is “an ineffective mechanism for criminal defend-
ants to obtain relief” for system-wide failure.  Effec-
tively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address 
Underfunded Indigent Defense Systems, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 
1731, 1737 (2005). In contrast, courts, justice systems, 
and the public benefit when systemic flaws are addressed 
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systemically. Examples of productive results from sys-
tem-relief approaches include provision of resources 
necessary to cure denials of access to counsel caused by 
prior system overload.  See, e.g., Martha Ellen, St. 
Lawrence County Is Awarded Indigent Defense Grant, Wa-
tertown (New York) Daily Times, August 10, 2013 (dis-
cussing new resources provided pursuant to Hurrell-Har-
ring settlement).  As discussed below, the need for sys-
temic relief in the Dookhan cases is underscored by the 
vitally important nature of the constitutional viola-
tions and rights at issue here.  
  
II. TIMELY SYSTEMIC RELIEF IS NECESSARY TO CORRECT 
SYSTEMIC VIOLATIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS.  
The need for systemic relief in the Dookhan cases is 
further warranted by the significance of the systemic 
constitutional violations at issue here. First, the Com-
monwealth violated basic due process guarantees by 
tainting criminal prosecutions with fraudulent testimony 
by state witnesses.  See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 
264, 269 (1959). Indeed, “[w]rongful conviction [is] the 
ultimate sign of a criminal justice system’s breakdown 
and failure[.]” Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 
217, 227 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2010).  
Sadly, the initial constitutional wrong inflicted on 
thousands of people in the Commonwealth is exacerbated 
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by an independent constitutional violation: inability to 
access the courts, which is necessary to challenge their 
tainted convictions. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 
828 (1977) (describing right of access to courts as 
“fundamental”); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 
(1974) (same). This double due process denial is ex-
traordinary. Petitioners cannot cure their wrongful con-
victions despite the benefit of this Court’s “conclusive 
presumption” supporting a motion to vacate. For that 
presumption to have any meaning, the defendants must be 
able to file and pursue a motion to vacate their con-
victions in the courts.  Petitioners have shown that 
this is not feasible due to systemic overload of the 
public defense system. It is therefore necessary and 
appropriate for this Court to order a systemic remedy. 
It is equally important to emphasize that the fun-
damental nature of the constitutional rights at issue 
supersede considerations of cost and convenience. See 
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 512 (2004).  “Our ju-
risprudence does not ration constitutional rights based 
on the financial cost of preserving and enforcing those 
rights.”  Commonwealth v. Musser, 82 Va. Cir. 265, *5 
(Va. Cir. 2011) (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 
(1956)). 
Yet the case-by-case approach to remedying the Doo-
khan crisis puts the burden on the people most directly 
affected by government misconduct to vindicate their 
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rights. Unfortunately, the District Attorneys have made 
that burden unbearable by issuing ineffective, obscure, 
and confusing papers that fail to inform people of their 
rights and how to vindicate them. SRA 79. Those papers 
are so deficient as to make effective case-by-case ad-
judication impossible, even if the Commonwealth’s public 
defense system were fully equipped for the task. It is 
particularly shocking that those papers actually encour-
age recipients to contact the very prosecutors whose 
interests demonstrably conflict with people who have 
tainted convictions. That encouragement may be an ac-
knowledgment that the Commonwealth’s defense system can-
not respond effectively to the systemic overload created 
by government misconduct. Regardless of the intended 
meaning of these papers, their substantive deficiencies 
are compounded by questions whether all eligible defend-
ants received them as well as the unrealistic expecta-
tion that recipients can decipher the papers and respond 
appropriately to correct government misconduct. All of 
these factors contribute to an ongoing effective denial 
of the right to be heard on a matter of vital importance.   
Compounding this matter are the additional 18,000 
Farak cases tainted by still more corruption in the Com-
monwealth’s forensic system. These thousands of cases 
will only further strain an already overburdened crimi-
nal legal system. That new burden will exacerbate harms 
already caused to the Dookhan defendants. All of these 
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harms are attributable to the Commonwealth.  They double 
down on the systemic constitutional violations that 
tainted these convictions in the first place, and fur-
ther highlight the constitutional crisis created by the 
inability of the Commonwealth’s public defense system to 
assist the thousands of people whose plight Petitioners 
have presented so clearly and comprehensively to this 
Court.  
This Court should not countenance any further delay 
in ordering a systemic remedy for the “egregious” mis-
conduct in these cases.  Just as it has long been rec-
ognized that courts have an “essential obligation to 
provide a remedy for violation of a fundamental consti-
tutional right, Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 227 (cit-
ing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 147 (1803)), it is 
equally well established that “[j]ustice delayed is jus-
tice denied.” U.S. v. Hastings, 847 F.2d 920, 923 (1st 
Cir. 1988). Justice is being denied by the current case-
by-case approach to remedying the Commonwealth’s mis-
conduct.  The scope of the requested remedy is “propor-
tional to the scope of the violation.” Brown v. Plata, 
563 U.S. 493, 531 (2011). Immediate systemic relief is 
the necessary cure.   
It remains only to emphasize that, beyond being 
unconstitutional, it is patently inequitable to demand 
that defendants, particularly the low-income defendants 
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who dominate the Dookhan cases, bear the burden of cor-
recting the Commonwealth’s systemic failures.  Where the 
State obtains convictions based on false evidence, 
“[t]he State must bear the responsibility for the false 
evidence.  The law forbids the State from obtaining a 
conviction based on false evidence.”  Matter of Inves-
tigation of West Virginia State Police Crime Lab., 438 
S.E.2d 501, 505 (W. Va. 1993).  Despite efforts to re-
solve these injustices on a case-by-case basis, experi-
ence shows that approach to be unworkable and constitu-
tionally insufficient.  The responsibility to right 
these wrongs must be borne by the Commonwealth, to whom 
this Court has conclusively attributed them.  Faced not 
with hundreds of individual motions, but instead with 
tens of thousands of them, this Court should order sys-
tem-wide relief now.   
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CONCLUSION 
In Scott, this Court described the misconduct that 
tainted the Dookhan cases as “particularly insidious … 
form of government misconduct that has cast a shadow 
over the entire criminal justice system,” and acknowl-
edged the due process interests at stake in curing that 
harm.  467 N.E.3d at 352.  The time has come to rectify 
that misconduct and fully vindicate those due process 
interests. Experience has demonstrated that Petitioners’ 
request for system-wide relief is tailored to ongoing 
and serious harm. This Court should order the Dookhan 
convictions vacated with prejudice or with a severely 
limited opportunity for district attorneys to justify 
refiling charges in specific cases that are supported by 
untainted evidence, and for the defense of which the 
Commonwealth’s public defense attorneys have sufficient 
resources to provide timely, quality representation. 
Only such comprehensive relief can cure the serious con-
stitutional  
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violations in these cases and begin to restore integrity 
to the Commonwealth’s criminal justice system. 
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